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Role of Lawyers in Vietnam's No Longer
Cautious Embrace of Globalization
DAVID A. GANTz*
During the past thirty years, Vietnam has evolved from a closed, communist/socialist state
with little respect for the rule of law-or lawyers-to a still-communist state but one which is
increasingly driven by market forces, global competition, and development of a more smoothly
functioning and predictable legal system. The article traces this process from the end of the
Vietnam War, through the initial economic opening under "Doi Moi," to negotiation of the
bilateral trade agreement with the United States and, finally, to the WTO accession process.
In each instance, emphasis is placed on the growing role that the law and lawyers have played
in what is promising to be a successful embrace of globalization.
The enthusiastically communist/socialist state that was Vietnam from the departure of
U.S. troops in 1974 until about 1985, what Carol Rose terms a "command economy,"'
had no use and little respect for attorneys, whether in the very limited domestic private
sector, in government, or from overseas. A few U.S.- and French-trained attorneys re-
mained after 1974, mostly in the Saigon area, but most Vietnamese who had been trained
in the law left after the Communist takeover in 1975. During this more than twenty-year
period, few lawyers were educated at law schools in Vietnam-probably no more than 200
to 500 per year. A limited number were sent overseas, usually to the U.S.S.R., where it
has been argued that the "legal" education was in fact far more focused on socialist
ideology.2
But by the early 1980s, first in the agricultural sector and then more broadly, it was
becoming painfully obvious that the collectivization of agricultural production and the
virtual prohibitions on private business were damaging what was left of the post-war econ-
omy, 3 making it virtually impossible for the nation to generate, from foreign or domestic
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Study, 32 LAW & Soc'v REv. 93, 97 (1998) [hereinafter Rose].
2. Id. at 97-99.
3. ROBERT TEmPLER, SHADOWS AND WIND: A VIEW OF MODERN VIETNAM 57-59 (Penguin Books,
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investment, jobs for the estimated one million Vietnamese entering the work force each
year.4 (Other causes of severe economic problems, including disastrous wars with Cambo-
dia's Pol Pot regime beginning in 19785 and China in 19796, were important but are
beyond the scope of this essay).
The end result of these challenges was the so-called "Doi Moi" ("renovation") policy
officially adopted by the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1986 after several years of de-
bate, discussion, and more than a little dissent from those in the government who feared
an economic opening would threaten the stability of the regime.7 The essence of Doi
Moi, as originally enacted, was political and social renewal through rapid industrial
growth and development.8 Doi Moi was the beginning of a twenty-year period that
brought normalization of political and economic relations with the United States through
the U.S.-Viemam Bilateral Trade Agreement (VBTA) in 1995 and 2001, respectively,9
and, in January 2007, saw Vietnam become a member of the World Trade Organization' 0
after approval of the WTO General Council in November 2006.11 For purposes of this
essay, the most important aspects of Doi Moi were the initiation of policies aimed at
encouraging foreign investment, stimulating exports, and increasing the competitiveness
of the local economic structure, both state-owned and private. Legal reform flowed from
such policies, although much more slowly than in retrospect was desirable and with more
than a little backsliding, in turn bringing about a resurgence of the legal profession and
legal education.
Part I of this essay briefly summarizes the economic and, to a much more limited ex-
tent, political developments from 1974 to 1986. Part II views the development of the Doi
Moi policies from 1986 to about 1995. Part III discusses developments in the 1995-2000
period, focusing on the negotiation and conclusion of the VBTA. Part 1V discusses the
WTO accession process, completed with Vietnam's formal accession to membership in
January 2007. Finally, Part V discusses some recent developments in Vietnam, indicating
an awareness by Vietnamese officials that the legal system continues to have shortcomings,
and sets forth plans for far-reaching reforms in the legislative process and the functions of
the judiciary as well as the role of lawyers in society.
In each section, much of the emphasis is on the growing role and importance of the
legal profession. The profession consists first of indigenous Vietnamese attorneys staffing
the Trade, Justice, and other ministries responsible for negotiating and drafting the trade
4. Id. at 342 (1998-1999 estimates).
5. STANLEY KAINOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 54-56 (Penguin Books, 1997) [hereinafter KARNow].
6. TEMIPLER, s.upra note 3, at 114 & 285.
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. Luke Aloysius Mcgrath, Vietnam's Struggle to Balance Sovereignty, Centralization, and Foreign Investment
under Doi Moi, 18 FORDHAM INt-rL L. J. 2095, 2096 (1995) [hereinafter Mcgrath].
9. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade
Relations, U.S.-Vietnam, Jul. 13, 2000, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World-Regions/Southeast_
AsiaPacific/Vietnam/assetupload-file804_5101.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter VBTA].
10. See Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 14, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154, available at http://www.wto.org /English/docs.e/legal-e/04-wto.doc [hereinafter V/TO Agreement]
(creating the World Trade Organization in April 1994).
11. Press Release, VTO, General Council Approves Viet Nam's Membership (Nov. 7, 2006), available at
httpJ/www.wto.org/english/news..e/presO6e/pr455-e.htn (last visited Dec. 11, 2006) [hereinafter VITO
Press Release]; VTO, Vietnam to join WTO on 11 January 2007, Dec. 12, 2006, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/acc_viemam_12dec06_e.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).
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agreements, preparing the legislation and presenting those laws for enactment to the Na-
tional Assembly, and assuring the implementation process, including myriad regulations,
continues at the ministry and sub-ministry levels. At least three other groups of attorneys,
however, played a significant role. The Australian, French, British, American, and other
foreign attorneys staffed branch offices in Saigon and/or Hanoi beginning in the late
1980s. An even larger number of legal consultants from those nations, Canada, Singa-
pore, Sweden, and other EU nations, usually funded by bilateral aid agencies or the inter-
national financial institutions, provided technical assistance of varying quality and
relevance to government ministries, the National Assembly, and various law faculties,
among others. 12 Finally, one should not underestimate the legal "education" provided to
a very bright, dedicated group of Vietnamese government lawyers by the lawyers and
other negotiators at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Department
of State, and other U.S. government agencies, as well as delegations of foreign govern-
ments negotiating other trade and investment agreements with the Government of Viet-
nam during this period. 13
I. Creating an Economic Crisis, 1975-1985
From the late 1940s to at least 1979, the policy of Vietnam was one of collectivization.
Post-1975, the emphasis was on land redistribution, both in the north and the south.
When the state entered into rice purchasing and distribution, yields decreased and much
of the stockpiled rice was wasted. Food imports increased with an impact that went be-
yond the rice market per se, to the point where cooperatives were again authorized. How-
ever, continuing state intervention, along with heavy taxation, reduced many of the gains
of the late 1970s and ultimately produced famine in some parts of the country.14
The collectivization was not, of course, limited to land under the communist system.
Industry already in place was also brought under state ownership and control, embracing a
Soviet style economic system.' 5 The impact on Vietnam's then existing legal system was
predictable. Vietnam's legal system historically is considered a mix of the various invading
powers: Chinese (neo-Confucian), French (parallel to the existing system at the end of the
Nineteenth Century) and American (overlaying Vietnam's own "ancient tradition of
law"). 16 An "Indochina Law School" operating between 1920-1950 in Hanoi trained
many Vietnamese lawyers in the French system; during the U.S. period, 1960 to 1975,
12. By way of example, the author has made six trips to Vietnam to consult with the Ministry ofJustice, the
National Assembly, and a large group of actual or hopeful international trade law professors, supported at
various times by the United Nations Development Programme, the Swedish International Development
Agency, the World Bank, and the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council.
13. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Total Number of Bilateral
Investment Treaties Concluded, June 1, 2005, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-pcbb/docs/
vietnam.pdf (last visited June 7, 2006) (indicating that Vietnam had concluded 40 BITs, primarily during the
1990s, of which 38 were in force).
14. TII',LER, sitpra note 3, at 57-58. The diet of the average Vietnamese did not increase between 1960
and 1990, with malnutrition remaining a serious problem for thirty years. Id. at 61.
15. Rose, supra note 1, at 97.
16. Id. at 95-96.
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some Vietnamese lawyers were trained by visiting American lawyers and law professors or
in the United States.
17
Almost everything changed in 1975 in the south as well as the north after the with-
drawal of U.S. forces and the Communist takeover of the entire country. There was,
understandably, both an anti-legal and anti-colonialist attitude within the Vietnamese
government. In a process that was not unique to Vietnam, the government ruled by de-
cree, no objection to administrative orders was permitted, legality became at best a for-
mality, and even the Ministry of Justice was eliminated from 1961 to 1981.18 When
Vietnamese lawyers were sent abroad to train, it was usually to the Soviet Union or East-
ern Europe; many of today's most important upper to middle level legal bureaucrats were,
in fact, trained in such institutions, training that, in the author's view, produced a number
of first-rate lawyers. The climate for traditional members of the legal profession was thus
not the most positive one.
Reevaluation of these policies was stimulated by the obvious concerns: an agricultural
production crisis, an absence of foreign investment, and insufficient domestic financial
resources for economic development and job creation. There were shortages of common
goods, the annual inflation rate was more than 100 percent, and the Soviet Union had
recently reduced economic assistance.' 9 "[T]he Vietnamese economy was dysfunctional"
with the failure of heavy industry to develop production, the bureaucracy blocking all
market forces, and the emergence of a black market.20 Ultimately, the result of these
factors was the adoption of a limited market-based system and policies to encourage for-
eign investment and stimulate the economy, formally occurring at the Sixth Communist
Party Congress in 1986.
H. Doi Moi and the Economic Opening, 1986-1995
The steps taken under Doi Moi included a substantial decrease in the reach of central
planning, with price controls lifted on many commodities and decollectivization of agri-
cultural land.2' There was not, however, an elimination of state enterprises or even a
reduction in their substantial role in the economy.22 Efforts to "equitize" (privatize) state
enterprises in the early and mid-1990s were official policy, but lagged in practice.23
A major goal of Doi Moi was to stimulate an increase in foreign investment; that goal
required a legal structure, and such reform, however imperfect, began to take place. Dur-
ing the period 1987-1995, a new constitution was adopted (1992) and over 100 laws, in-
17. Id. at 97.
18. Id. at 97-99.
19. Phong Tran, Vietnam's Economic Liberalization and Outreach: Legal Reform, 9 LAW & Bus. REv. Am. 139
(2003) [hereinafter Phong Tran].
20. Id. at 142.
21. Mcgrath, supra note 8, at 2103.
22. At least one author argues that not only did Doi Moi not decrease the role of the state in the
Vietnamese economy, but it actually increased it due to new foreign investment in state firms. TEmPLER,
supra note 3, at 144.
23. William A.W. Nielson, Asia's Economic Crisis Poses Challenges for Vietnam as Doi Moi Enters Second Dec-
ade, 20 No. 2 E. AsiAN ExECUTIVE REP. 9 (1998).
VOL. 41, NO. 3
DOI MOI, THE VBTA AND WTO ACCESSION 877
cluding a Civil Code, were enacted. 24 Doi Moi was expanded in 1991 to explicitly include
legal reform, with the predictable references to "running the nation by law." 25 Legislation
alone, of course, did not resolve potential problems for foreign investors due to a lack of
regulations and other guidelines, a lack of effective dispute settlement mechanisms and
other ways of forcing national and local officials to comply with the laws, and, perhaps
most significantly, a continuing lack of competition in many sectors of the economy. For
example, the "peoples' courts" were dominated by Party officials who were ill-trained,
particularly for dealing with commercial disputes, and lacked independence from the exec-
utive. The Vietnamese Communist Party was also subject to criticism, occasionally in
public and more vehemently after the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, for mismanagement, corruption, muzzling of the press and over-rigidity;
it was said to be out of touch with the "real situation in the country." 26
The success of the Doi Moi in stimulating investment was mixed, at best, with a falling
off experienced in the mid-1990s, well before the broader Asian financial crisis in 1997.27
This was probably a result of continued influence of, and favoritism toward, the state
sector coupled with the fact that the initial package of business legislation was more a
control mechanism than one focused on economic growth. Under key laws, for example
on private enterprises and companies, various restrictions remained, including onerous
state approval requirements, high costs of incorporation, high minimum capital require-
ments, a variety of special licenses and limits on access of foreign investors to some sec-
tors, and the general frustrations of dealing with the government.',
However, it was significant that this shift under Doi Moi to some semblance of a nation
of laws implied that lawmakers, both in the National Assembly and in the government,
would have to improve their legal skills. The Ministry of Justice, which had been back in
business since 1981, increased its influence in the government hierarchy, and by the end of
the first ten years of Doi Moi, available law school slots had increased to 2,000, fourfold
from a decade earlier.2 9 Legal and foreign training for lawyers remains, however, deter-
mined in significant part by their age. The oldest generation is French; the middle, Rus-
sian; and the youngest, home-grown Vietnamese with significant American influences.
In the early 1990s, foreign legal assistance grew in volume, with visiting foreign lawyers
and academics as well as a Swedish-sponsored economic law and legislative drafting pro-
ject in 1991. By 1996, various donors, including governments, NGOs, foundations, and
law firms, had pledged or spent over $13 million in legal assistance, often described as
supporting Vietnam's movement toward freer markets. The major players included the
UNDP, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank as well as the governments of
Denmark, Sweden, Canada, France, Japan, and Australia,3 0 all of which are still active in
Vietnam today. U.S. efforts remained very limited, at least until 1988, but later blos-
24. Mcgrath, supra note 8, at 2117; see Rose, supra note 1, at 100-01 (discussing the laws and ordinances
that had been adopted).
25. See Rose, supra note I, at 99 (quoting from Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet).
26. See TFPLaiR, supra note 3, at 120-121 (recounting a BBC speech by Party member and military officer
Bui Tin in December 1990).
27. Phong Tran, supra note 19, at 153.
28. Id. at 150, 152-53.
29. Rose, sopra note 1, at 101.
30. Id. at 106-08
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somed, as discussed below. Certainly, many dozens if not hundreds of foreign lawyers had
the opportunity to participate in the various projects.
Around the same time, no doubt encouraged by the increase in foreign investment,
foreign law firms began operations in earnest in Vietnam, with more than thirty estimated
to be operating by 1998 primarily from Europe, Australia, Hong Kong, and the United
States. As in many other developing countries, foreign legal professionals served private
clients (primarily in foreign investment and establishment areas), hired and trained
Vietnamese attorneys, and, from time to time, assisted Vietnamese government agencies
in reviewing drafts of proposed laws and ordinances.31 However, foreign legal activities
were apparently viewed with suspicion by the Vietnamese government, which reacted with
onerous licensing requirements, restrictions on hiring local attorneys, restricting legal ad-
vice to international law, and, occasionally, interfering with such basic aspects as renting
office space and obtaining telephone lines. Notably, this changed significantly with the
advent of the VBTA.
I. Negotiating the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, 1996-2000
The mixed success of Doi Moi and the remnants of failed economic policies for at-
tracting foreign investment and improving living standards, the demise of the Soviet
Union, the Asian financial crisis, and the increase in the export successes of China along
with the normalization of political relations with the United States in 1995 gave Vietnam
both challenges and opportunities. In different ways, the Chinese and U.S. influences
were likely most important in convincing Vietnamese officials at the highest levels to con-
clude the VBTA.
It is probably difficult to overemphasize the importance of China in influencing
Vietnamese economic policies over the last ten years or so. China, even before WTO
accession in November 2001, was highly successful in attracting foreign investment, far
more so than Vietnam or its Association of South-East Asian Nation (ASEAN) partners. 32
Moreover, in 1996, more than half a decade after Tiananmen, the rapidly increasing eco-
nomic opening of China did not appear to be threatening the Communist regime. Viet-
nam had to find some way to compete. Doi Moi and related legal reforms did not cease
during the second half of the 1990s. Rather, the same pressures that ultimately led to the
VBTA and to WTO accession encouraged continuing efforts with regard to new incen-
tives, or removal of disincentives, to foreign investment through further amendment of
relevant legislation. 33 It was becoming obvious, however, that Doi Moi, alone, was not
enough.
31. Id. at 119-20.
32. In 1995, direct foreign investment in China was $36 billion, compared to about S4 billion each for
Indonesia and Malaysia, and only $1.4 billion in actual investment commitments for Vietnam. See AsIAN
DEVELOPMENTF BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTiLOK 1996 & 1997 109, 113 (1997) (Vietnam data); Press
Release, Asian Development Bank, Foreign Direct Investment Spurs Asia's Development 1 (1999) (China,
Indonesia, Malaysia data).
33. Phong Tran, sutpra note 19, at 154.
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In 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN 34 and became a party to the ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA),35 no doubt hoping that AFTA membership would increase exports to
other ASEAN/AFTA members, particularly Singapore and neighboring Thailand. In
1998, during the midst of VBTA negotiations, Vietnam became a member of Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC)36 and hosted the 2006 APEC annual meeting.
The obvious reasons for Vietnam to improve diplomatic and economic relations were
highly practical. Unlike other members of ASEAN and China, after 1951 for Commu-
nist-controlled areas and then for the entire country between 1975 and 2001, Vietnam had
only limited access to the highly lucrative U.S. market because the lack of "most favored
nation" (MFN) treatment for its exports to the United States made the exports prohibi-
tively expensive. 37 Such status is automatically conferred by GATT/WTO membership,
but otherwise is normally available only through the conclusion of a bilateral trade agree-
ment with the United States, such as the agreement the United States and China con-
cluded in 1979.38 With its back nearly against the wall in the second half of the 1990s, the
prospect of increased exports to and investment from the United States must have seemed
very attractive to Vietnamese officials. Some observers believed that concluding a trade
agreement with the United States was important to Vietnam for political reasons as well as
a part of its continuing efforts to balance its relations between China and the United
States.39
According to the principal U.S. negotiator of the VBTA, 40 both President Clinton and
Secretary of State Warren Christopher expected the opening of diplomatic relations in
1995 to be followed with a process of economic normalization. The United States, partic-
ularly USTR, had a very clear idea of what that meant. Rather than follow the practice
undertaken with China in 1978 whereby China obtained MFN trading status on the basis
of a narrow commercial agreement, 4 1 USTR was intent on negotiating a comprehensive
accord which could be an effective tool to open up the still largely closed Vietnamese
market and would include not only trade in goods but trade in services, protection of
34. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]: Overview, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (last
visited Jun. 1, 2006).
35. Protocol for the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Agreement on the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Dec. 15, 1995, available at http://
www.aseansec.org/12372.htm (last visited Jun. 1, 2006).
36. See Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], Member Economies, available at http://
www.apec2006.vn/subpage/page/4 (last visited June 5, 2006) (listing members and dates of joining).
37. For example, large screen color television receivers normally dutiable at 5% ad valoren are subject to a
35% duty when imported from a non-MFN "Column 2" country. Item 8525.12.32, Harmonized Tariff
Schedules of the United States, available at http://www.usitc.gov.
38. Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, U.S.-
P.R.C., July 7, 1979, available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/agreements/chintra.html (last visited June 1,
2006) [hereinafter China MFN Agreement]. This is a roughly 20-page document limited to trade in goods
and a few commercial establishment issues.
39. See Joseph M. Damond, Give Trade a Chance: The Negotiation of the U.S. Vietnam Trade Agreement
65 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Damond] (attributing the view to one of
Vietnam's senior negotiators); Michael R. Gordon, Rumiseld, Visiting Vietnam, Seals Accord to Deepen Military
Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A8 (positing that the bilateral decision to increase military contacts
resulted in part from Vietnam's efforts to "establish more balance with its neighbor to the North").
40. Damond, supra note 39, at 2.
41. China MFN Agreement, supra note 38.
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intellectual property, and possibly investment.42 The VBTA thus ended up looking more
like the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in terms of its scope than the
typical commercial agreements concluded by the United States in the past.
The comprehensive trade agreement approach prevailed, but only after some four and a
half years of difficult negotiations and an additional year, from mid-1999 to mid-2000, in
which the Vietnamese Government agonized over whether the completed agreement
should be formally concluded. Ultimately, the VBTA was signed almost exactly five years
after political relations were normalized. 43 Even in the last months before signature in
July 2000, there was apparently "an intensive period of analysis and soul-searching" within
the highest levels of the Vietnamese government in which the defenders of inefficient
state-owned enterprises and those concerned with "security" clashed with the freer trad-
ers.
44 Ultimately, the VBTA was approved by both the Vietnamese National Assembly
and the U.S. Congress and became effective December 10, 2001.45
The U.S. negotiators had taken the position that the size of the Vietnamese economy
was such that its economic development, if it were to follow the paths of Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, China, and other countries in Southeast Asia, would be successful only if Vietnam
were willing to accept in the VBTA W%7TO-type disciplines, such as national treatment/
nondiscrimination and the avoidance of non-tariff barriers like import quotas and govern-
ment subsidies. There was no "WTO-Lite" option. If Vietnam was not willing to con-
clude a comprehensive agreement, the United States would wait until they were. 46 It is
also clear that U.S. negotiators saw the VBTA as just a step toward WTO accession, a
process where additional market opening concessions would be demanded 47 even though,
in principle, the U.S. negotiators accurately assured Vietnamese officials that they sup-
ported Vietnam's INTO accession. How clearly the Vietnamese realized this at the time
of the VBTA negotiations is much less evident, as Vietnamese officials were concerned
that some of the VBTA obligations went well beyond V/TO rules and wanted the United
States to treat the VBTA commitments as the basis for later WTO accession. 4 8 (The
Vietnamese were certainly correct in the area of investment, as the current WTO Agree-
ments contain nothing on investor protection that approaches the scope of Chapter IV of
the VBTA.)
Equally significant for Vietnam, the VBTA negotiations, and the subsequent efforts to
implement the agreed obligations under Vietnamese law, became a long and painful but
vitally important educational process in the legal requirements of the world training sys-
42. Damond, svpra note 39, at 5-6, 11.
43. Id. at 131.
44. Id. at 114.
45. In the United States, such agreements with communist countries are approved by Congressional joint
resolution under a variant of "fast-track" legislation. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, ch. 5,
§§ 151, 404, 405, 407, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975); VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
VIETNAM TRADE AGREEMENT: APPROVAL AND IMPLEAIEN-ING PROCEDURE (July 6, 2001). The VBTA
was approved in Vietnam by Res. 48-2001-NQ-QH-10 of the National Assembly (Nov. 28, 2001); see
UNITED STATES-VIETNAM TRADE COUNCIL EDUCATION FoRm [USVTC], CATALOG OF LEGAL UP-
DATES: VIETNAM TRADE POLICY REGIME 11 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter CATALOG], available at http://
www.usvtc.org/updates/legal/Catalog/CatalogAug06.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
46. CATALOG, supra note 45, at 54.
47. Id. at 95.
48. Id. at 120.
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tem, a critically necessary first step toward WTO membership. The VBTA inevitably also
generated a major legal reform through rewriting of many laws and regulations in order to
implement the agreement, a consideration that became obvious to the Vietnamese negoti-
ators early on.4
9
The educational process was not primarily driven by the lawyers, as the chief negotia-
tors on neither side were attorneys, and the principal non-governmental facilitator was
another non-lawyer, U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council (USVTC) President Virginia Foote. 50
However, USTR and other U.S. and Vietnamese government attorneys played a critical
role at virtually all stages of the negotiations and drafting processes, and a former USTR
attorney and official, providing "technical assistance" to the Vietnamese through the good
offices of the USVTC, apparently played a key role in helping the Vietnamese negotiators
understand the implications of what the United States was demanding, particularly in the
area of protecting foreign investment.5 1 Also, private foreign attorneys, many practicing
law in Vietnam, provided important feedback to the U.S. negotiators. 52
During the negotiations, Vietnam also continued to benefit from a variety of foreign
government and institutionally funded foreign legal assistance projects, such as those of
the UNDP headed by then regional legal adviser John Bentley, an American attorney who
had worked for over thirty years on international investment and business transactions and
on legal and institutional reform in Egypt before moving to Vietnam in the mid-1990s.
53
In the second half of the 1990s, USAID expanded its technical assistance on legal and
commercial reform issues, initially in support of the VBTA negotiations and later to assist
in the implementation process. Just before entry into force of the VBTA in late 2001, the
latter resulted in the creation of the multi-year "Support for Trade Acceleration" or "Star-
Vietnam" program, which provided legal and economic analysis and recommendations as
well as a variety of training workshops, study tours, and publication and translation of
reference materials. 54
There seems little doubt that the combination of "educational" activities from the out-
set of the negotiations until the conclusion reflected, at least in the view of the U.S. nego-
tiators, a "much greater level of sophistication with respect to the [VBTA] issues" 55 on the
part of the Vietnamese negotiators than had been evident at the outset.
49. Id. at 53.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id. at 58. By the mid-1990s, Daniel Price, a partner in a private law firm, had been one of the principal
negotiators of the NAFTA investment chapter. See generally Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INFIr'L LAW. 727 (1993) (discuss-
ing Chapter 11 in part from the point of view of a negotiator).
52. Damond, snpra note 39, at 45.
53. Among Bentley's many contributions to Vietnamese legal reform was his work with several Vietnamese
and foreign lawyers on "Completion of Viemam's Legal Framework for Economic Development," which was
prepared for the Minister ofJustice. See Media Release, United Nations Development Programme [UNDP],
UNDP Paper Recommends Changes to Legal Framework (Apr. 20, 1999), available at http://
www.undp.org.vn/mr/1999/eng/990420e(undp).htm (last visited June 5, 2006).
54. Embassy of the United States-Vietnam, USAID Vietnam Program, http://hanoi.usembassy.gov/
usaid.programs.html (last visited Jun. 5, 2006).
55. Damond, supra note 39, at 112.
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The end result, the VBTA, was a comprehensive agreement.5 6 The VBTA is not and
was not designed to be a free trade agreement or customs union as those terms are used in
the GATTIWTO context (Article XXV) because it does not eliminate restrictions on
substantially all trade within a reasonable period of time. It is more accurately a "freer"
trade agreement in that it causes a reduction of Vietnamese tariffs and gives Vietnam
MFN access to the U.S. market. However, in the most basic measure, increased trade, it
has been wildly successful, with Vietnamese exports to the United States between 2000
and 2006 increasing from about $822 million to $9 billion, and U.S. exports to Vietnam
increasing from less than $400 million to $1.1 billion, after peaking at over $1.3 billion in
2003. 57 U.S. investment in Vietnam rose to about $3.3 billion based on implemented
(rather than registered) projects. 5s
The VBTA includes chapters on trade in goods (reducing tariffs and tariff barriers on
the part of Vietnam and providing MFN treatment on the part of the United States);
intellectual property rights (similar to VWTO obligations under TRIPS5')); trade in services
(incorporating most of the WTO GATS60 disciplines, the U.S. GATS schedules, and an
extensive series of Vietnam services market access obligations, including hotly-debated
rights relating to financial and telecommunications services ); investment relations (a sort
of "BIT-lite" but including the basic investor protection obligations and international ar-
bitration of investor-state disputes); various business facilitation measures; extensive trans-
parency obligations (including publication of laws and administrative or judicial review of
administrative decisions); and a series of exceptions and general provisions.6 1
In terms of the impact on lawyers and on legal system reform, the intellectual property
chapter is likely proving to be the most difficult to implement. The basic obligation under
Article 11 "[e]ach Party shall ensure that its enforcement procedures are fair and equita-
ble, are not unnecessarily complicated or costly, and do not entail unreasonable time lim-
its or unwarranted delays," along with the specific legal and procedural obligations, have
proved difficult to achieve in practice for most LDCs, even those with Western-style legal
systems. 62 The VBTA also provides detailed requirements for judicial enforcement proce-
dures and for "provisional measures." 63
Other provisions that have required significant changes in laws and regulations include
those on business facilitation and transparency. In the latter instance, they are designed to
56. U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council [USVTC], Summary of the Agreement between the U.S. and Vietnam on
Trade Relations (2000), available at http://www.usvtc.org/trade/bta/summary-EN.pdf.
57. Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Investment & U.S. Agency for International Development, Assess-
ment of the Five-Year Impact of the U.S. - Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement on Vietnam's Trade, Investment, and
Economic Structure, Jul. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.usvtc.org/misc/STAR%20BTA%201mpact%20
Report%207-3-07.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
58. Id.; see also Jane Perlez, U.S. Competes with China for Vietnam's Allegiance, N.Y. TiMEs, Jun. 19, 2006, at
3 [hereinafter Perlez].
59. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPsl,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.doc.
60. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/26-gats.doc.
61. VBTA, supra note 9, chs. I-VII.
62. Id. art. 11.
63. Id. art.12.
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create a more open economic and commercial system for Vietnam, similar in many ways
to Article X of GATT but with much more detail. The objective is a legal and administra-
tive process that avoids unpleasant surprises to business and provides an opportunity for
interested parties, whether foreign or domestic, to comment on regulations that will affect
them before the regulations go into force. Administrative and judicial tribunals for review
and correction of administrative actions must be maintained.(4
The VBTA has constituted a massive implementation challenge. As one expert sug-
gested in late 2001, "[i]t is an open question whether the Vietnamese government has the
will or the wherewithal to implement the pervasive reforms required by the U.S.-Vietnam
bilateral trade agreement." 65 The answer, with the benefit of six years' hindsight, is em-
phatically "yes." The Vietnamese government, after a review of existing laws, began in
2002 to amend dozens of legal instruments (laws, ordinances, regulations, etc.) as required
for compliance with the VBTA's provisions, 66 and almost all such changes have been en-
acted, although not always in ideal form.
Interestingly, Vietnam ultimately agreed to open up its legal services market to a signifi-
cantly greater degree than has been the case in many other Asian nations, with the excep-
tion of Singapore, apparently because officials were convinced by foreign attorneys, both
private and within the U.S. government, that the presence of foreign lawyers would facili-
tate foreign investment. Foreign law firms may establish 100 percent equity ownership in
legal firms, joint ventures, and branches and have a five year renewable license. While
foreign lawyers may not appear in Vietnamese courts, their firms may advise on
Vietnamese law if they hire Vietnamese lawyers qualified for practice in Vietnam.67 Im-
plementing regulations have been issued,"s although some law firms believe that in the
absence of the right of Vietnamese lawyers to hold equity interests in the foreign firms, it
is and will be difficult to keep Vietnamese lawyers on staff.69
IV. Vietnam's Accession to the WTO, 2001-2006
The WTO Agreement provides no detailed guidance on the admission of new mem-
bers.711 It simply provides that "[alny state ... may accede to this Agreement, on terms to
be agreed between it and the WTO.'71 Decisions on accession are taken by the "Ministe-
rial Conference," the trade ministers of the Member nations, specifying a two-thirds
vote.7 2 In practice, however, accession decisions have always been taken by consensus, as
with virtually all other decisions under the WTO Agreement by the Members.
64. Id. ch. IV, art. 7.
65. ARK E. MANYIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCII SERVICE, TIlE VIETNAA-U.S. BILATERAL TRADE
AGREFIENr,'" 15 (Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://www.usvtc.org/info/crs/bta-decOl.pdf.
66. CATALOG, supra note 45, at 13-15.
67. VBTA, snpra note 9, at G4.
68. Decree 175-2003-ND-CP (Sept. 1, 2003).
69. US VTC, TCfE U.S.-VIETNAM BILATERAL TRAi)E AGREEMENT: A SURVEY OF COMPANIES ON LI.PLE-
MENTArION IssuFS 35 (May 10, 2004), available at http://www.usvtc.org/trade/bta/survey.pdf (last visited
Aug. 31, 2006).
70. See generally WTO Agreement, sitpra note 10.
71. Id. art. XII:1.
72. Id. art. XII:2.
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The accession process normally begins with the candidate first providing detailed infor-
mation on its trade and economic policies to a "working party" of interested Members,
followed by a series of parallel bilateral talks between the candidate and individual mem-
bers who request such talks on tariff rates, access commitments, and other goods and
services policies. As the WTO guidance accurately suggests, "[t]he talks can be highly
complicated. It has been said that, in some cases, the negotiations are almost as large as an
entire round of multilateral trade negotiations. '73 Once the bilateral negotiations have all
been concluded, the working party finalizes the terms of accession, in effect combining the
bilateral agreements into a single package because, under the principle of non-discrimina-
tion, the benefits garnered by any Member in its bilateral agreement with the candidate
are applied to all other WTO Members. 74 In most cases, including that of Vietnam, the
prospective member is providing information to and negotiating with the working party
simultaneously, focusing its efforts to conclude bilateral agreements with those Members
that have requested such negotiations.
The process of Vietnam accession, like that of China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, has
been a long, complex, and frustrating one. While application was initially made in 1995,
virtually no major progress toward accession was made until 2001, after the Vietnamese
government at the highest levels made the political decisions necessary to open the mar-
ket, initially by signing the VBTA. That decision, itself, was likely motivated in part by
the fact that by late 2000, it had become increasingly obvious that China's twenty-year
quest for WTO membership would be concluded soon, a step which would likely make it
even more difficult for Vietnam to compete with China for foreign investment and trade
opportunities. Another likely factor was the prosecution of U.S. anti-dumping cases
against tri and basa (catfish) and shrimp, 75 which provided, inter alia, an excellent lesson as
to why it could be useful for Vietnam to have access to the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body 76 to challenge national administrative decisions imposing trade remedies in Geneva.
More rapid progress made during the 2004-2006 period likely reflects an important
political lesson as well: China's WTO accession, with the accompanying opening of com-
petition and markets, has confirmed earlier indications that the requirements of accession
had not in any significant way threatened the "stability" of the communist regime in
China. This remains, logically enough, a matter of extreme importance in Vietnam. The
recent prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, and the president, Nguyen Minh Triet, have
both been described as persons who support economic change but as "political diehards
73. See VWTO, Understanding the VTO: The Organization, Membership, Alliances, and Bureaucracy,
How to Join the WTO: The Accession Process, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-c/
org3_e.htm (last visited June 6, 2006) (summarizing the accession process).
74. Id.
75. SeeJoshua Startup, From Catfish to Shrimp: How Vietnam Learned to Navigate the Waters of"Free Trade" as
a Non-Market Economy, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1963 (2005) (discussing the challenges Vietnam faced in defending
itself against these trade actions).
76. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (1994). Ecua-
dor, one of the six countries affected by the U.S. anti-dumping case against shrimp, challenged the U.S.
antidumping determination and prevailed. Panel Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp
firom Ecuador, WT/DS335/R, (Jan. 20, 2007, adopted Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/dispue/cases_e/ds335_e.htm (last visited Sep. 12, 2007). Brazil, Chile, China, EC, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, and Thailand participated as "third Parties," although Vietnam, not a Member of the WTO at the
time, could not do so.
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who favor the Chinese model: economic transition to open markets with firm Communist
Party political control." 77
On the more positive side, some Vietnamese policymakers likely realized, then and now,
that WTO membership for Vietnam would make Vietnam a very good place for compa-
nies that wished to hedge their bets by not placing all of their manufacturing assets in
China or in any other single nation.7 8 Vietnamese wages have reportedly been 25 to 30
percent lower than in China, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that even some Chinese
factories are relocating to Vietnam.
79
Nevertheless, Vietnam missed its primary target date for admission at the Hong Kong
WTO Ministerial Meeting in December 2005 and had to settle instead for the beginning
of 2007 (with accession celebrated [ . .] at the APEC Summit in Hanoi in November
2006).80 In any event, Vietnam did not submit any major new materials, including tariff
schedules with reduced tariff commitments, a new services offer, and an "action plan" for
implementing legislation, to the Working Party until October 2003.81 Working party ne-
gotiations were held periodically, once or twice a year, with Vietnam at each session mak-
ing major or minor new concessions, and the working party essentially asking for more
after explaining the insufficiency of what was currently on the table.
At the same time, some thirty VTO Members, including the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, Japan, China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and Mexico, had con-
cluded bilateral agreements, the last being Mexico in April 2006 and the United States in
May 2006.82 The bilateral process represents, for most VTO Members, the last and best
opportunity they will have for demanding that an existing or potential world trading
power open its own goods and services market to outside competition. Additionally, there
is the view that by concluding a strong WTO accession agreement, the terms of which
constitute a binding treaty obligation, the economic and legal reforms agreed to by the
candidate nation will effectively become irreversible.
For the United States, the sticking points in its bilateral negotiations included: reduc-
tion of most Vietnamese non-agricultural tariffs to 15 percent or less ad valorem; signifi-
cant reduction of agricultural tariffs, many to 15 percent or less; and improved market
access for the financial, telecom, distribution, courier, and energy services.8 3 The United
States may treat Vietnam, as they may China under China's accession agreement, as a
"non-market economy" for the purposes of anti-dumping actions for up to twelve more
years, a generally unfavorable approach typically resulting in higher anti-dumping duties
77. See Perlez, supra note 58, at 3 (attributing these views to "analysts" of the current regime).
78. See Seth Mydans, A Fervor for Capitalism Sweeps Vietnam, IN ''L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 26, 2006 (quoting
John Pincus, the Vietnamese country representative for the UNDP, as indicating that Viemnam was seen as a
stable hedge for firms that have invested heavily in China).
79. Perlez, supra note 58, at 3.
80. WTO Press Release, supra note 11.
81. See WVTO, Accessions: Vietnam, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc e/al-vietnam_.
e.hos; CATALOG, silpra note 45 (the primary sources for information and documents concerning Vemain's
accession process). Interestingly, the E.U. concluded its negotiations a year and a half earlier to great fanfare
in Vietnam and elsewhere. However, for the E.U., early conclusion and any resulting political benefits were
economically risk-free because the final WTO agreement with Viemnam would roll in the benefits negotiated
by the holdouts, the United States and Mexico.
82. CAALoG, supra note 45, at 6, 9.
83. Id. at 6-7.
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when such duties are imposed. Vietnam also agreed to eliminate prohibited agricultural
subsidies at the time of accession (i.e. without any grace periods). In virtually all these
areas, Vietnam's commitments go somewhat beyond what was agreed in the VBTA.
The United States, for its part, agreed to drop its bilateral textile and apparel quota
agreement in return for a one year "safeguards" mechanism in the event of surges in
exports to the United States and Vietnam's undertaking to immediately end all WTO-
illegal subsidies related to those products. This was a critical victory for Vietnam, al-
though it was potentially undermined later, as noted below. Since WTO Members were
effectively required to eliminate textile quotas for other Members as of January 1, 2005,84
Vietnam had been in a difficult competitive situation as the only major textile and apparel
exporter subject to quotas on exports to the United States through a bilateral agreement.8 5
The United States also agreed to modify the so-called "Jackson-Vanik" legislation so as to
be able to provide "permanent normal trade relations" treatment (MFN) without the need
for annual action by the President. This process was not finally completed until early
December 2006 because of internal wrangling in Congress, and with the controversial
undertaking of the Bush Administration to self-initiate anti-dumping investigations
against Vietnamese textile and apparel exports under certain circumstances.8 6 Ironically, it
was thus a strong possibility that when Vietnam finally became a WTO member in early
January 2007, the United States would have been in the very unfortunate position of hav-
ing to invoke the "non-application" clause, depriving both countries temporarily of the
full benefits of Vietnam's WTO accession.8 7 Fortunately, that did not happen.
Despite the continuing bilateral and working party negotiations, by 2004 the focus of
implementation had changed from the VBTA, per se, to what Vietnam was doing domesti-
cally with regard to enacting the national laws, ordinances, and regulations that would be
necessary for Vietnam to comply with the parallel and additional obligations it was in the
84. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 2:8(c), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_elegal_e/16-tex.doc.
85. Office of Textiles and Apparel [OTEXA], Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-Made Fiber,
Non-Cotton Vegetable Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products Between the Governments of the United
States of America and the Socialist Republic of Fietnam (Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://www.usvtc.org/trade/
other/textiles/otexa-TextileAgreement.htm (last visited July 7, 2006).
86. U.S. legislation to give Vietnam PNTR status was introduced on June 13, 2006, but was not enacted by
Congress until December 9, 2006, ultimately by a comfortable bipartisan margin in the House and over-
whelmingly in the Senate. The PNTR vote was delayed due to concerns of U.S. textile producers regarding
the sufficiency of the safeguard measures in the U.S. bilateral and a tight pre-election Congressional calendar.
A Bush Administration undertaking to self-initiate anti-dumping actions against Vietnamese textiles and ap-
parel under certain conditions, certainly a more troubling prospect to Vietnam than the safeguards, in order
to placate several textile state senators raised concerns with importers and was roundly criticized by textile
importers as a terrible precedent. See Press Release, United States Trade Representatives [USTR], USTR
Susan Schwab Welcomes Congressional Action to Increase Trade with Vietnam (June 13, 2006) (noting intro-
duction of the legislation that day); Christopher S. Rugaber, Trade Policy: Dole Places Hold on Vietnam PNTR;
Senate Consideration Likely to Slip to September, 23 INT,'L TRADF REP. 1162 (Aug. 3, 2006) (reporting on
objections by Senators Dole and Graham); American Chamber of Commerce Vietnam, Textile Interests Fight
Over Interpretation of Sep [sic] 28 Letter from USTRICommerce Secretary (Oct. 6, 2006) (discussing the circum-
stances under which the Commerce Department would self-initiate).
87. See Permanent Mission of the United States, Invocation by the United States of Article Xlll of the Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization with Respect to Viet Nam, WT/L/661 (Nov. 7, 2006)
(invoking the non-application clause at the time of General Council approval of Vietnamese membership, a
reservation withdrawn with the enactment of PNTR).
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process of accepting with WTO accession. The Working Party insisted that Vietnam
enact essentially all the legislation that the Working Party deemed necessary for imple-
menting Vietnam's accession obligations before accession was granted for review, in En-
glish translation, by the Working Party. Presumably, this reflected some dissatisfaction
with the rapidity with which China had issued implementing laws and regulations in the
period since China's WTO accession in November 2001. As a result, Vietnam enacted
changes in hundreds of laws, decrees, and regulations beginning in 2004 and further expe-
dited in 2005 and 2006, primarily through the efforts of the Ministries of Justice and
Trade and the National Assembly. These included key statutes such as the Law on Enter-
prise, the Law on Investment, the Law on Conclusion of International Treaties, and vari-
ous tax laws.8 8
In addition to the requirements of the U.S. bilateral agreement, which were incorpo-
rated in the WTO accession agreement [... ], the eventual accession package included,
inter alia: elimination of all but a handful of tariff quotas; signature by Vietnam of the
WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA), allowing the importation of products
covered by the ITA duty-free no later than 2014; and elimination of agricultural export
subsidies and limiting trade-distorting domestic subsidies to about US$246 million annu-
ally. Major commitments in services, particularly telecommunications and financial ser-
vices, were also made along with extension of trading (export/import) rights to all duly
registered persons, including foreign firms and individuals.89 Vietnam also agreed imme-
diately to comply with WTO disciplines under the agreements on customs valuation, rules
of origin, pre-shipment inspection, anti-dumping safeguards, subsidies and trade-related
investment measures, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and
trade-related intellectual property.90
It is apparent that not only in the negotiations, but perhaps even more in the legislative
drafting and enactment process, that the role of the government attorneys, led by the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) (which is principally responsible for VBTA and WTO imple-
mentation), has been most significant. Mostly the same relatively small group of twenty-
five to thirty-five was, in fact, quite well prepared for the WTO process. The author
recalls a March 2005 project for the World Bank in which he was asked to draft a report
on the implementation of Vietnam's WTO Obligation for attorneys in the MOJ and
members and staff of the National Assembly. In the process, the author was provided a
copy of a very long and detailed report that had been prepared on the same subject by a
group of MOJ and several other government lawyers a month earlier, essential for a thor-
ough review and critique. There was, in fact, very little for the author to add to the MOJ's
comprehensive analysis, except for a few recommendations. But what was perhaps most
telling, in terms of demonstrating the level of expertise that the Vietnamese legal estab-
lishment had attained, was a four-hour meeting in Hanoi where the author and the
Vietnamese contingent discussed all of the various XVTO implementation issues, includ-
ing intellectual property, services, trade in goods, investment, etc., in detail and in En-
glish, with no interpretation for anyone!
88. CAITALOG, supra note 45, at 13-25.
89. IAO Press Release, supra note 11. The commitments are contained in the accession agreement and
in the Working Party report.
90. Id.
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However, the growing level of international trade expertise was not limited to the gov-
ernment. By 2006, the two leading law faculties in Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh City Law
University and the Hanoi Law University, were both in the process of incorporating re-
quired international trade law courses in their first undergraduate law degree curriculum,
and many others were expected to follow.91 The seriousness of this massive educational
effort is illustrated by the fact that key sections of Professor Raj Bhala's international trade
textbook, about 700 pages worth, was recently published in Vietnamese as the result of a
USVTC sponsored project. This author, and perhaps many of his international trade law
colleagues at other U.S. law schools, has often dreamed of a situation in which all J.D.
candidates would be required to take international trade law!
V. Legal and Judicial Reform
The Government of Vietnam has continued its efforts to regularize the practice of law
and improve the functioning of the judiciary and legal system, a process that is key to
WTO compliance, to maintaining Vietnam's international competitiveness for foreign in-
vestment, and to permitting Vietnamese citizens to benefit more fully from Vietnam's
embrace of globalization. In June 2006, a "Law on Lawyers" was enacted, which governs,
inter alia, the practice of law by both Vietnamese citizens as well as foreign law firms and
lawyers operating in Vietnam. 92 The latter are given substantial flexibility, probably going
beyond the requirements of the VBTA as discussed earlier, including a right to consult on
Vietnamese law if the individual has obtained a Vietnamese law degree. 93 A foreign lawyer
may not, however, "participate in legal proceedings as a defense counsel . . . or as the
representative of a client before the bodies conducting legal proceedings in Vietnam."9 4
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the number of new lawyers in Vietnam is
skyrocketing. By 2005, lawyers were emerging from the major Vietnamese law faculties
and from the "legal institution training course" at a rate of 4,000 to 4,500 persons per
year,9 5 a far cry from the early 1970s.
More significantly, a long-term judicial reform strategy has been developed and is now
in the process of implementation. A 2005 resolution of the Politburo recognizes that:
duties still have many weaknesses. Criminal policy, as well as civil legislation and
laws on judicial procedure have outdated elements and have been slowly revised and
amended. The organization, mandates, tasks, and operational mechanism of judicial
organs seem unreasonable in many aspects. There is still a shortage of judicial and
judicial support staff. The professional qualifications and political ability of some
officials are low. Some of them even have very low personal qualifications, morals
and professional accountability. There have been a number of wrongful decisions in
91. Based on author's discussions with law professors in Hanoi in August 2004 and at various times with
Virginia Foote of the USVTC.
92. Law on Lawyers, Jun. 29, 2006, No. 65/2006/QH1 1,1 1th Legis., 9th sess., arts. 1, 70, passim, available
at http://www.usvtc.org. (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (translation).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Email correspondence with Nghiem Thanh Tung of the USVTC, (Aug. 10, 2006) (copies on file with
author).
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investigations, arrests and detentions, prosecutions and trials. The infrastructure of
the working facilities of judicial organs are [sic] insufficient and outdated. 96
The stated objective is to build:
an ethical, healthy, strong, democratic, strict, fair and justice-protecting judiciary, as
well as [to ensure] that the judicial will be modernized on a step-by-step basis to serve
the Socialist Fatherland of Vietnam and its people and that judicial activities, among
which adjudication plays the key role, will be highly efficient and effective.97
In parallel developments, the Politboro recognizes, despite some years of reforms, that
broader problems in the legal system remain:
[In general, our legal system still has many shortcomings. The system is still not
comprehensive and consistent; its viability is still low; and its implementation in prac-
tice remains slow. The mechanism for making and amending laws has many deficien-
cies and is still not properly observed. The speed of law-making activities is slow.
The quality of the laws is not high. There is lack of attention paid to the research
and implementation of international treaties to which Vietnam is a party. The effec-
tiveness of legal dissemination and education is limited. Institutions for law imple-
mentation are still inadequate and weak. 9s
These detailed, long-term plans, if successfully implemented, could greatly improve the
functioning of the legal and judicial systems and increase the confidence that Vietnamese
and foreigners have in both.
VI. Conclusion
The completion of a two decade long process, from Doi Moi to the VBTA to WTO
membership for Vietnam, reflects a long and difficult movement of the nation toward a
market-oriented economy and major elements of the rule of law while still leaving its
communist system largely intact. Despite the fits and starts, the nation has, in the view of
World Bank officials, effectively climbed from being poor to middle income in about fif-
teen years, with per capita incomes expected to exceed $1,000 by 2010, compared to $180
in 1993. 99 The process has benefited from and helped generate a thriving domestic legal
community, perhaps setting the stage for a situation in three to five years where the
awareness by the general legal/professional population of the requirements of the interna-
tional trading system will be broader and deeper than in most other countries.
However, WTO accession is perhaps best viewed as an analogy to a university gradua-
tion: a commencement of a long-term process toward a truly open economy and the wide-
spread rule of law. The implementation of VBTA and VNTO obligations is, of course,
96. Communist Party Central Committee, Resolution of the Politburo on the Judicial Reform Strategy to
2020, No. 49-NQfFWV at 1 (June 2, 2005) (translation).
97. Id. at 2.
98. Communist Party Central Committee, Resolution of the Politburo on the Strategy for the Develop-
ment and Improvement of Viemam's Legal System to the Year 2010 and Direction for the Period up to 2020,
No. 48-NQfTW at 1, (May 24, 2005) (translation).
99. See Perlez, supra note 58, at 3 (quoting Klaus Rohland, the World Bank country director in Vriemam).
FALL 2007
890 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
nowhere near finished, and conversion to a fully functioning rule of law society is some
distance from completion, as Section V clearly indicates. The amendment and, hopefully,
improvement of key laws is likely to continue sua sponte and in some instances under pres-
sure from other WTO Members or even the Dispute Settlement Body, and new and
revised regulations will continue to be issued. Government lawyers and judges will con-
tinue for some years to struggle, inter alia, with the requirements of prosecuting those
accused of intellectual property violations and offering business persons, foreign or do-
mestic, redress against government actions that have violated laws, regulations, or individ-
ual commercial rights.
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